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ABSTRACT 
The vast majority of case law establishes that, in the absence of a 
specific agreement to the contrary, the deposit of funds into a bank 
creates a debtor-creditor relationship, pursuant to which depositors 
are deemed creditors of their respective banks.  In effect, depositors 
loan their deposits to banks, which may then use such deposits for 
ordinary banking activities, including investment and lending, 
speculative or otherwise.  This Article examines the case history 
pertaining to this legal classification and proposes that such case 
history does not comport with depositor intent, is not supported by 
purportedly relevant legal premises (as illustrated by an analogy to 
deposits of commodities in the agricultural context), and does not 
justify the conclusion that bank deposits give rise to debtor-creditor 
relationships.  The Article proceeds to explore the practical 
consequences of the anomalous legal classification of bank deposits 
as loans instead of the natural and obvious alternative—bailments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A client walks into a bank with the intention of depositing personal 
or business funds.  The bank’s teller gladly accepts the deposit, credits 
the client’s account accordingly, and the client departs content that what 
transpired was an ordinary-course banking transaction.  Simultaneously, 
however, a curious phenomenon occurs, one which effectively 
transforms the legal nature of the transaction into something very 
different from that which our unwary depositor intends.  That curious 
phenomenon, which willfully ignores the nature of the deposit as 
understood by both parties, subverts the intentions of only one party.  
What the depositor intends to be in the nature of a bailment, the law 
transforms into a loan; where ordinary people expect a bailor-bailee 
relationship, the law creates a creditor and a debtor.  Title to the 
deposited funds passes from the depositor to the bank, and usually only 
the bank knows it.  Upon this legal transformation is built the leviathan 
that is the global banking system. 
This Article evaluates the reasons for the anomalous legal 
classification of ordinary bank deposits as loans instead of bailments, 
the reasons for treating depositors as creditors to banks, and the 
consequences of classifying banks as debtors to depositors.  This Article 
concludes that (i) there is no legal justification for treating ordinary bank 
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deposits as loans, depositors as creditors, or banks as debtors in the 
ordinary deposit context; (ii) the default legal relationship that exists 
between a depositor and a bank should be that of bailor and bailee—a 
loan arising only by express agreement, in accordance with depositors’ 
expectations; (iii) the fungible nature of deposits, and the fact of 
commingling, pose no legal or practical obstacles for the robust law of 
bailments and its application to the deposit context; and (iv) the 
classification of ordinary deposits as loans pursuant to which banks 
acquire title to deposited funds has costly social, economic, and legal 
consequences. 
Part I of this Article describes the relevant terminology and then 
proceeds to examine the case history pertaining to the legal nature of 
deposits in the banking context, particularly during the 19th century.  
Part I also illustrates that the precedent established by applicable 19th-
century case law, a precedent codified during the 20th century by many 
states through their respective banking regulations, is essential to the 
modern banking system, but conflicts with depositors’ intentions and 
creates an inherent discrepancy between the practical relationship, on 
the one hand, and the legal relationship, on the other, between depositors 
and banks. 
Part II examines the historical reasons underlying the case law 
classifying an ordinary bank deposit as a loan instead of a bailment in 
the absence of an agreement to the contrary and proceeds to evaluate the 
relative merits of the myriad legal justifications for this classification 
proffered by various state and federal courts. 
Part III provides a legal justification for treating deposits as 
bailments.  In particular, Part III explores the nature of deposits of 
agricultural goods in the commodity warehouse context and shows that 
such transactions are analogous to the deposit of money in the banking 
context.  The part then examines the history of agricultural transactions 
and the legal relationship that exists between farmers (or similarly 
situated parties) and warehouse operators pursuant to case law and 
applicable statutory law.  Part III concludes by arguing that there is no 
legal justification for differentiating between money deposits in the 
banking context and commodity deposits in the agricultural context. 
Part IV introduces the ubiquitous practice of fractional reserve 
banking and explains that its existence depends on the default legal 
classification of an ordinary deposit as a loan.  Part IV should be 
understood as the crux of the article that explains the connection 
between the legal classification of ordinary demand deposits as loans (as 
described in Parts I, II, and III) and the consequences of such 
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classification (as described in Parts V, and VI).  In particular, Part IV 
hypothesizes that the primary intended purpose of the default legal 
classification was the retroactive legitimization of the widespread but 
legally dubious use of deposited funds by banks for investment and 
lending purposes. 
Part V employs Aesop’s fable of the Ant and the Grasshopper to 
illustrate that, in the banking context, the prudence of 100% reserve 
banks is undermined by the existence of fractional reserve banks.  Part 
V proceeds to show that the rise of deposit insurance marginalizes 100% 
reserve banks by rendering them superfluous, leaving fractional reserve 
banks as the only practical banking alternative. 
Part VI concludes this Article by discussing some of the 
consequences of the anomalous classification of ordinary demand 
deposits as loans instead of bailments together with the implementation 
of systematic deposit insurance.  The discussion addresses bank 
insolvency, speculative and excessive banking activity (i.e., lending and 
investment), inflation, moral hazard, systemic financial instability, and 
other ramifications for deposit insurance, disguised social policy, and 
economic and social disruption. 
I. RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY AND ORIGIN OF DEFAULT LEGAL RULE 
In the ordinary deposit context and in the absence of express 
agreement to the contrary, title to deposited funds automatically passes 
from the depositor to the bank in what is typically called a “general 
deposit.”  In the case of general deposits, a bank assumes the legal 
obligations of a debtor to the depositor in respect of the deposited funds, 
and undertakes a contractual or legal obligation to return the deposited 
funds “on demand” or, in the case of “time deposits,” subject to certain 
restrictions identified in Part IV below.  Prior to the return of deposited 
funds, however, the bank in the general deposit context may use the 
available funds for its general business purposes including lending and 
investment, subject to applicable federal and state banking regulations.  
Conversely, if a depositor and a bank agree explicitly to establish a 
bailment, a “special deposit” arises where title to the deposited funds 
remains with the depositor, and the bank assumes the legal obligations 
of a bailee.  For example, under New York law a “bailment of money is 
created . . . when a special or specific bank account is created, title to the 
funds remains with the account holder, and the funds are separated from 
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other deposits.”1  In the special deposit context, the bank is not 
permitted to use deposited funds for its general business purposes.  The 
process by which these ordinary deposits came to be classified as loans 
instead of bailments is of critical importance.  In the 1864 case Marine 
Bank v. Fulton, the Supreme Court observed: 
All deposits made with bankers may be divided into two classes, 
namely, those in which the bank becomes a bailee of the depositor, 
the title of the thing deposited remaining with the latter; and that 
other kind of deposit of money peculiar to the banking business, in 
which the depositor, for his own convenience, parts with the title to 
his money, and loans it to the banker; and the latter, in consideration 
of the loan of the money and the right to use it for his own profit, 
agrees to refund the same amount, or any part thereof, on demand.2 
Most jurisdictions now use the “special deposit” / “general deposit” 
framework to make the substantive distinction between a bailment and a 
loan, respectively; and, since the particular terminology used is not 
crucial to the central thesis, this Article will use the terms “special 
deposit” and “bailment” interchangeably, and the terms “general 
deposit” and “loan” interchangeably.3 
Having established the possible alternatives, subsequent courts set 
forth to explain the procedure for determining whether “a deposit was 
made without condition or special agreement”; i.e., whether it was 
special or general, a bailment or a loan.4  In the Second and Sixth 
Circuits, that procedure amounts to an evaluation of depositor intent: 
“[w]hether a deposit in a bank is general or special depends upon the 
mutual understanding and intention of the parties at the time such 
deposit is made.”5  By supposition, however, the steps thus far 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Rozsa v. May Davis Grp., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(emphasis added); see also Warren v. Nix, 135 S.W. 896 (Ark. 1911), Woodhouse v. 
Crandall, 64 N.E. 292 (Ill. 1902), Kimmel v. Dickson, 58 N.W. 561 (S.D. 1894). 
 2. Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 69 U.S. 252, 256 (1864). 
 3. But see Nix, 135 S.W. at 898 (“But we think there is a clear distinction between 
a loan and a general deposit. When a loan is made, the money is borrowed for a fixed 
time, and the borrower promises to repay such amount at a fixed future date. But a 
general deposit is payable upon demand; in effect, the money thus deposited is kept 
under the control of the depositor, because it must be kept at all times subject to be paid 
upon his check. The money so deposited or its actual equivalent is returned to the 
depositor upon demand.”). 
 4. Thompson v. Riggs, 72 U.S. 663, 678 (1866). 
 5. Peoples Westchester Sav. Bank v. F.D.I.C., 961 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Keyes v. Paducah & I.R. Co., 61 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1932)). 
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elaborated do not result in a definitive legal classification of the nature 
of the deposit, precisely because the depositor and the bank do not have 
a mutual understanding or intent.6  What is needed (at least from the 
bank’s perspective) is a default rule that classifies the deposit as general, 
not specific.  Courts nationwide eagerly obliged:  the Second,7 Ninth,8 
and Tenth9 Circuits cite the Sixth Circuit for the proposition that “a 
deposit made in the ordinary course of business is presumed to be 
general.”10  District and state courts followed suit: in New York, 
“[a]bsent evidence of intent, New York law presumes that deposits are 
general rather than specific”;11 under Florida law, “[a] bank becomes the 
absolute owner of money deposited with it . . . in the absence of any 
special agreement importing a different character into the transaction, 
and the relationship between the parties is simply that of debtor and 
creditor”;12 under South Carolina law, “[i]t is an important part of the 
business of banking to receive deposits; but when they are received, 
unless there are stipulations to the contrary, they belong to the bank, 
become a part of its general funds, and can be loaned by it as other 
moneys [sic]”;13 in Arkansas, “the general rule [is], that where money . . 
. is deposited with a bank . . . the law presumes it to be a general deposit, 
until the contrary appears”;14 in Texas, “[w]hen money . . . is deposited 
in a bank without any special agreement . . . the relation of debtor and 
creditor is created between the bank and the depositor, and the deposit is 
                                                                                                                 
 6. To be precise, I assume the depositor believes her deposit to be a bailment and 
that the bank understands it to be a loan.  I add that the bank likely understands that the 
depositor is subject to a mistaken belief regarding the legal classification of her deposit. 
See, e.g., Nix, 135 S.W. at 898–99 (“Certainly, the thousands who daily deliver money 
to banks for safekeeping and return in corresponding currency do not regard the 
transaction as a loan, nor do they so speak of it.”) (quoting Allibone v. Ames, 68 N.W. 
165, 166 (S.D. 1896)). 
 7. Peoples Westchester Sav. Bank, 961 F.2d at 330. 
 8. Thompson v. Beitia, 69 F.2d 356, 358 (9th Cir. 1934) (quoting N. Sugar Corp. 
v. Thompson, 13 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1926)). 
 9. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Variable Life Annuity Life Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 
1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 10. Keyes, 61 F.2d at 613. 
 11. Rozsa v. May Davis Grp., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 12. City of Miami v. Shutts, 51 So. 929, 931 (Fla. 1910) (quoting Camp v. First 
Nat’l Bank of Ocala, 33 So. 241, 243 (Fla. 1902)). 
 13. Leaphart v. Commercial Bank of Columbia, 23 S.E. 939, 941 (S.C. 1896). 
 14. Dawson v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 283, 297 (1843). 
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general”;15 and in California, “[i]t is unquestionably true that one 
making a general deposit with a bank in the usual course of business 
parts with title to the moneys deposited.”16 
Further, in order that the legal presumption inhere with practical 
substance, courts drove the point home:  again in the Second and Ninth 
Circuits, “the burden of proof is on the depositor to overcome such 
presumption by proving that the deposit was . . . a special deposit, or a 
deposit for a specific purpose, as distinguished from a general 
deposit”;17 in the Southern District of New York “[w]here there is no 
written contract, the party asserting a bailment must establish, in light of 
all the circumstances, that the parties agreed to a contract with definite 
terms”;18 and, in the Eighth Circuit, “a deposit made in the ordinary 
course of business is presumed to be general, and the burden of proof is 
upon the depositor to overcome such presumption by proving that the 
deposit was made upon such terms and conditions as to constitute it [sic] 
a special deposit or a deposit for a specific purpose, as distinguished 
from a general deposit.”19  Perhaps tellingly, the Third Circuit 
sidestepped the perfunctory evaluation of depositor intent, and 
straightforwardly declared “money deposited in a bank becomes the 
property of the bank in the sense that the bank may use it as its own.”20 
In effect, the above case law and the ensuing state legislation 
ensures that in the absence of an agreement between the parties, a 
deposit is subject to a legal presumption that determines the respective 
rights of each party in connection with their deposits.  More specifically, 
the process of (i) distinguishing between possible classifications, (ii) 
assessing the mutual intent of the parties, and (iii) establishing a default 
rule that classifies deposits as general in the absence of evidence of the 
parties’ intent, effectively renders into loans the vast majority of 
deposits made in the nation’s banks precisely by ignoring depositors’ 
intentions, notwithstanding the self-evident observation that most 
                                                                                                                 
 15. McBride v. Am. Ry. & Lighting Co., 127 S.W. 229, 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1910). 
 16. Anderson v. Pac. Bank, 44 P. 1063 (Cal. 1896). 
 17. Peoples Westchester Sav. Bank v. F.D.I.C., 961 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Keyes v. Paducah & I.R. Co., 61 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1932)); Thompson v. 
Beitia, 69 F.2d 356, 358 (9th Cir. 1934) (quoting Keyes, 61 F.2d at 613)). 
 18. Rozsa v. May Davis Grp., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 19. N. Sugar Corp. v. Thompson, 13 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1926). 
 20. In re Erie Forge & Steel Corp., 456 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1972). 
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depositors do not intend to be creditors to their respective banks.21  
Thus, under most circumstances, the first two steps of the above-
described process constitute perfunctory gestures that suggest a lawful 
basis exists for classifying a deposit in a manner that conflicts with the 
intentions and understanding of ordinary depositors.  Accordingly, what 
ultimately matters is the third step—the default legal conclusion that 
deposited funds are general deposits (i.e., loans from depositors to 
banks) coupled with the requirement that depositors bear the burden of 
disproving such conclusion by proffering explicit evidence of agreement 
to the contrary.  That step seems to be an aberration of the common law, 
unjustified by recourse to the mutual understanding of both parties as 
illustrated by the legal relationship recognized to exist between 
warehouse operators and those who deposit fungible commodities into 
such warehouses, as described in Part III infra. 
The perfunctory nature of the process is evidenced by the Supreme 
Court’s 1866 observation, only two years after Marine Bank, that it was 
“well settled” law that if a deposit was “made without condition or 
special agreement of any kind . . . the depositor parts with the title to his 
money, and loans it to the bank.”22  Two years is apparently ample time 
to gloss over extant precedent in an otherwise analogous field of law; 
i.e., the law of bailments in the context of deposits of fungible 
agricultural goods, and to ordain that an anomalous legal conclusion is 
“well settled.”  Indeed, most observers would probably not agree that it 
“is axiomatic that the relationship between a bank and its depositor 
arising out of a general deposit is that of a debtor and creditor.”23  To 
argue as much is to boot-strap the “axiom,” without which the 
reasonably presumed legal relationship between a depositor and a bank 
is that of bailor to bailee, not creditor to debtor.24  Having established 
the genesis of the default legal rule that renders ordinary deposits into 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Warren v. Nix, 97 Ark. 374, 381 (1911) (“Ordinarily the depositor understands 
that he is leaving his money for safekeeping, to be returned upon his order upon 
demand, and not that the identical pieces of money left with the bank will be returned, 
but only its equivalent.  He does not ordinarily understand that he is making a loan to 
the bank when he makes a deposit therein.”). 
 22. Thompson v. Riggs, 72 U.S. 663, 678 (1866). 
 23. Morse v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 142 Cal. App. 3d 228, 232 (Ct. App. 1983). 
 24. The Supreme Court’s 1966 statement that “[t]he relationship of bank and 
depositor is that of debtor and creditor, founded upon contract” is instructive to the 
extent it fails even to mention the intent of the parties.  Bank of Marin v. England, 385 
U.S. 99, 101 (1966). 
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loans, and by corollary renders ordinary depositors into lenders, we’re 
left wondering why.  Subsequent courts attempted to answer this 
question.  But, as Part II demonstrates, these attempts did little more 
than restate the conclusion. 
II. HISTORICAL REASONS FOR DEFAULT LEGAL RULE 
Historically, courts classified deposits as loans in part because they 
possessed a narrow understanding of bailments as applied exclusively to 
fungible goods.  For example, well more than a century ago, an Illinois 
appeals court in Mutual Accident Association of the Northwest v. 
Jacobs, stated that if “there is no obligation to restore the specific 
article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal 
value, the contract is not that of bailment.”25  Seventy years later, using 
the terminology from Part I, the Third Circuit applied similar reasoning 
to define bailor-bailee relationships in the banking context: “A ‘special’ 
deposit or account is one where the identical money or thing deposited is 
to be kept safe and returned as deposited.  The relation of debtor and 
creditor is not created, but that of bailor and bailee is, title remaining in 
the bailor.”26 
In 1866, twenty-five years before Jacobs, the Supreme Court in 
Thompson v. Riggs lent its weight to a narrow definition of bailments: 
deposits, the Court stated in dicta, “may be made under circumstances 
where the legal conclusion would be that the title to the thing deposited 
remained with the depositor, and in that case the bank would become the 
bailee of the depositor, and the latter might rightfully demand the 
identical money deposited as his property.”27  The supposition is, of 
course, that if a bailment exists, the bailor must have the right to demand 
that the identical money deposited be returned.28  By implication, no 
commingling of the funds can occur, a conclusion that courts have 
acknowledged: “We also approve the principle . . . that where a 
depositor gives the bank the right to commingle his deposit with other 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Mut. Accident Ass’n of Nw. v. Jacobs, 43 Ill. App. Ct. 340, 343 (1891) 
(quoting Mallory v. Willis, 4 N.Y. 76 (N.Y. 1850)). 
 26. In re A.M. Townson & Co., 283 F.2d 449, 453 (3d Cir. 1960). 
 27. Riggs, 72 U.S. at 678 (emphasis added). 
 28. See, e.g., Mystic Color Lab, Inc. v. Auctions Worldwide, LLC, 284 Conn. 408, 
420 (2007) (stating that if a putative bailee is not required to return the identical 
deposited items, but may instead deliver any items of equal value, there is no bailment); 
see also, State v. Deutsch, 77 N.J.L. 292, 297 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Woodhouse v. Crandall, 
197 Ill. 104, 109 (1902). 
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funds owned by the bank, he creates only a general deposit whose funds 
the bank is authorized to use and disburse as it sees fit.”29 
The reasoning in Jacobs comports with the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Thompson, as illustrated by the Jacobs Court’s explanation 
that because a $6,000 deposit was not a bailment (since the specific 
funds were not to be returned), it was therefore “more in the nature of a 
loan” and that “the relation of debtor and creditor [was] created by the 
transaction.”30  This reasoning is correct, as far as it goes—a deposit 
must be either a bailment or a loan, and it cannot be both.  That 
conclusion also comports with the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in 
Marine Bank.31  But the reasoning also presupposes incorrectly that if 
the identical units of deposited currency are not to be returned (or cannot 
be returned, for practical reasons) then the deposit must not be a 
bailment.  As explained below, this conclusion does not follow from the 
premise that a deposit must be either a bailment or a loan, but not both, 
and the Court provides no explanation for this logical leap.  Thus, 
observers are left to wonder whether a definition of “bailments” that 
fails to account for fungible goods is sufficiently robust in a modern 
economy. 
To that end, the Jacobs Court’s description of the subject deposit 
suggests the possibility that it was aware of the logical leap, but, having 
determined that the deposit was not a bailment, had no alternative other 
than to use ambiguous language to conclude that the deposit was “in the 
nature of a loan”; but, apparently not a loan.32  Such equivocation is 
more than merely semantic and reflects the essence of the underlying 
dilemma; namely, everybody knows that depositors believe their 
deposits to be in the nature of a bailment, but all banks operate as 
though such deposits are loans.  Thus, phrases like “in the nature of” 
seem to be thinly-veiled attempts to skirt an essential legal issue.  Other 
courts have wrestled with the same difficulty.  For example, the Third 
Circuit in In re Erie Forge & Steel Corp. stated that “money deposited 
in a bank becomes the property of the bank in the sense that the bank 
may use it as its own.”33  This is consistent with the creditor-debtor 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Hudnall v. Tyler Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1970). 
 30. Jacobs, 43 Ill. App. Ct. at 346. 
 31. Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 69 U.S. 252, 256 (N.Y. 1864). 
 32. Jacobs, 43 Ill. App. Ct. at 346; see also, Downes v. Phoenix Bank, 6 Hill 297, 
300 (1844) (acknowledging some difficulty in denying that an ordinary bank deposit 
appears to be a bailment). 
 33. In re Erie Forge & Steel Corp., 456 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1972). 
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relationship, pursuant to which title to deposited funds changes hands, 
subject to an explicit or tacit contract to return such funds on demand.  
However, only one sentence later, the Third Circuit elaborated that “the 
mere deposit of money in a bank does not amount to a transfer of 
property.”34  This is exactly the crux of the issue, and the Court’s second 
point can’t be reconciled with the simultaneous conclusion that a 
depositor is a creditor and not a bailor, as exemplified by the first point.  
Either title to deposited funds remains with the depositor, as in the 
bailment context, or it passes to the bank, as in the creditor context.  
Indeed, this dilemma has been swept under the rug by the largest broom 
in the land.  At the beginning of the 20th century, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
A deposit of money to one’s credit in a bank . . . creates at the same 
time, on the part of the bank, an obligation to pay the amount of the 
deposit as soon as the depositor may see fit to draw a check against 
it.  It is not a transfer of property as a payment, pledge, mortgage, 
gift, or security.  It is true that it creates a debt . . . .35 
Dissecting the Court’s statements unveils a semantic and logical 
quagmire.  The first sentence is ambiguous, and it is not clear whether 
title to deposited funds changes hands.  The ambiguity is apparently 
resolved in the second sentence, as the Court states that deposits are not 
transfers of property.  This implies that the deposit must be a bailment, 
since no property is transferred; i.e., title to the property remains with 
the depositor.  But, alas, appearances are deceiving, as evidenced by the 
Court’s confusing final statement that the deposit “creates a debt,” 
notwithstanding the fact that there is no transfer of title to the property. 
This confusion is reminiscent of Jacobs.  Recall that in Jacobs, an 
Illinois appeals court held that a deposit was a loan because there was no 
agreement to return the specific deposited money.  But, the Jacobs Court 
made its task unnecessarily difficult, at least to the extent that buried in 
its opinion are facts that substantiate independently its holding: “it was 
the manifest intention of the parties that the $6,000 was not to be kept as 
a special deposit . . . and to remain unused in the [bank] . . . , but that it 
was to be . . . used in the regular . . . business” of the bank.36  If the 
intention of the parties regarding the status of the deposit was 
“manifest,” the Court’s legal gymnastics presumably were gratuitous.  
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. 
 35. New York Cnty. Nat. Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 147 (1904). 
 36. Jacobs, 43 Ill. App. Ct. at 345–46. 
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Such intention would be established by facts that, at the appellate level, 
were presumed true, and would be sufficient to reach the conclusion that 
the deposit constituted a loan without resort to a default rule classifying 
them as such.  In other words, the ultimate issue is precisely whether a 
depositor intends that the bank use deposited funds for its business 
purposes.  If so, the deposit is a loan; if not, the deposit is a bailment.  
Creditors intend that debtors use credited funds, bailors do not. 
In effect, the assumption that it is practically untenable to require 
banks to return identical deposits of currency leads to the reasonable 
conclusion that banks need only return currency deposits of equal 
value.37  That is, once courts concluded that depositors were indifferent 
to the return of identical units of currency (as opposed to units of equal 
value), a conveniently narrow conception of bailments induced these 
courts unnecessarily to conclude that title to deposited funds must pass 
from depositors to banks.  Thereafter, courts assumed that deposits of 
currency must be classified as general deposits as opposed to specific 
deposits.38  After all, if a bailment requires that the specific article 
deposited also be returned, and banks are commingling literally billions 
of homogenous deposits,39 then there is no practical way to conclude 
that such deposits constitute bailments, if only because banks cannot 
really track title.  Banking would grind to a halt as managers attempted 
to account for each depositor’s legal title to specific bills.  This explains 
the conclusion that title to deposited funds must pass from depositors to 
banks.  Such reasoning reduces to the following form: (i) initially, 
depositors have title to their specific deposits; (ii) then, bankers 
commingle these deposits en masse, and in the process lose track of 
title; therefore, (iii) courts concluded that depositors must lose title to 
their specific deposits.  With time, clause (i) is forgotten and the 
affirming-the-consequent nature of the above logical structure is 
resolved. 
But the issue needn’t be nearly so messy, and bailments are far 
more flexible as legal devices than courts suppose or banks prefer.  
Indeed, the practical inability to return the specific fungible deposit (i.e., 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Part VI, infra, explains that although returned deposits will have the same 
nominal or “face” value, they usually will not possess the same “real” value as that 
which inhered in the funds at the time of deposit. 
 38. See, e.g., Hossain v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 15 F. App’x 745, 748 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (quoting Bloomheart v. Foster, 221 P. 279, 281 (Kan. 1923)). 
 39. Homogenous for all practical purposes, of course, each bill is distinct at least to 
the extent that it has a unique serial number. 
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the dollar bill with the same serial number) poses no conceptual 
difficulty for the law of bailments.  Part III, infra, practically and legally 
debunks the notion that bailments require bailees to independently track 
title to fungible, commingled deposits, and sets the stage for a 
restoration of the reasonable and widely-held understanding that 
ordinary deposits are bailments, not loans. 
III. DEPOSITS OF FUNGIBLE, COMMINGLED GOODS IN THE 
AGRICULTURAL CONTEXT 
The practical relationship that exists between the depositors of 
fungible agricultural goods40 and the warehouses that store such goods is 
analogous to the practical relationship that exists between monetary 
depositors and banks.  During normal economic circumstances, a bank 
depositor may operate without interruption under the incorrect belief 
that the bank holds all deposits in the form of cash reserves; for 
example, she may write checks that draw upon her available balance and 
expect that such checks will be honored by the bank when presented for 
payment, and she may otherwise engage in ordinary banking activities 
without concern for the security of her deposits.  She may act as if her 
deposit were a bailment.  Similarly, for all practical purposes, the 
warehouse depositor transacts his business with the correct 
understanding that his deposit constitutes a bailment.41  However, the 
default legal relationship that exists in the bank deposit context is the 
antithesis of that which exists in the warehouse deposit context.  When a 
grain producer deposits his fungible goods with a warehouse, “the 
general rule is that a bailment is created by such a deposit . . . even 
though [the] grain belonging to the warehouse and various other owners 
                                                                                                                 
 40. E.g., grain or wheat. 
 41. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 60-02-25 (2013) (“[w]henever any grain shall be 
delivered to any public warehouse . . . such delivery shall be a bailment . . . .”); and 78 
AM. JUR. 2D Warehouses § 23 (2014), citing O’Keefe v. Equitable Trust Co., 103 F.2d 
904 (3d Cir. 1939); In re Ellis’ Estate, 24 Del. Ch. 393, 6 A.2d 602, 612 (Del. Orph. 
1939); Bonnett v. Farmers’ & Growers’ Shipping Ass’n, 105 Kan. 121, 181 P. 634, 
635–36 (1919); Moses v. Teetors, 64 Kan. 149, 67 P. 526, 527 (1902); New Domain 
Oil & Gas Co. v. Hayes, 259 S.W. 715, 716–17 (Ky. 1924) (recognizing rule); State v. 
Cowdery, 79 Minn. 94, 81 N.W. 750, 751 (1900); State v. Colonial Club, 154 N.C. 177, 
69 S.E. 771, 775 (1910); St. Anthony & Dakota Elevator Co. v. Dawson & Byfield, 20 
N.D. 18, 126 N.W. 1013, 1015 (1910); Savage v. Salem Mills Co., 48 Or. 1, 85 P. 69, 
74–75 (1906); Robertson v. Ramsey, 17 Tenn. App. 248, 66 S.W.2d 1022, 1035 (Ct. 
App. 1933) (recognizing rule); Barnes v. Patrick, 176 Wash. 142, 28 P.2d 293, 295 
(1934); and State v. Oakley, 129 Wash. 553, 225 P. 425, 427 (1924). 
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is from time to time added to the common mass, and sales and deliveries 
are made therefrom.”42 
Under ordinary economic circumstances, the distinction between 
the legal relationship and the practical relationship in the bank deposit 
context is of little relevance, at least from the perspective of the 
depositor.  However, during extraordinary economic circumstances, the 
actual legal relationship that exists is of particular importance, because 
the depositor will ordinarily act as though her deposit constitutes a 
bailment, whereas the bank will act as though it is a loan.  During a 
recession, banks suffer financial losses that bring into sharp focus the 
fact that such banks used deposits to make investments and loans that 
depositors did not authorize, and for which they will be liable.43  Before 
discussing extraordinary economic circumstances, however, an analysis 
of the similarities between a bank deposit and warehouse deposit help to 
illustrate that there do not appear to be any legal or practical reasons to 
classify the former as a loan and the latter as a bailment, absent express 
agreement to the contrary. 
For example, warehouse depositors can and do undertake 
transactions using warehouse receipts that in many respects parallel 
ordinary bank checking transactions.  The Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”) specifically contemplates the existence of such transactions in 
the warehouse deposit context: “a document of title [such as a 
warehouse receipt] is negotiable if by its terms the goods are to be 
delivered to bearer or to the order of a named person.”44  Similarly, the 
UCC contemplates equivalent transactions in the banking context: 
commercial paper, such as a certified or bank check, is a negotiable 
instrument if, among other things, it is “payable to bearer or to order.”45  
The analogy in this context is, of course, not to an ordinary personal 
check, but to a bank or certified check; however, the emphasized 
language will undoubtedly sound familiar to anybody who has handled a 
personal check, and who understands that signing a blank check or 
failing to identify the payee could result in losses to the drawer.  Highly 
                                                                                                                 
 42. 78 AM. JUR. 2D Warehouses § 23 (2014). 
 43. Deposit insurance, as discussed in Part V, infra, only appears to mitigate these 
losses. 
 44. U.C.C. § 7-104(a) (2012) (emphasis added).  See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(16) (2012) 
for the definition of “document of title,” which includes “warehouse receipt”; and 
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(42) for “warehouse receipt” defined as “a receipt issued by a person 
engaged in the business of storing goods for hire.” 
 45. U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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complex economic transactions occur in the financial and commodity 
context.  Accordingly, the need to engage in complex financial 
transactions using monetary deposits is apparently not sufficient to 
warrant the default loan classification in the warehouse deposit context 
even though it is sufficient to warrant that conclusion in the bank deposit 
context: the justification for treating deposits in the former context as 
loans and in the latter context as bailments cannot be found here. 
The similarities between a warehouse deposit and a bank deposit 
extend to the physical characteristics of the deposited item, at least to 
the extent that a warehouse deposit consists of a fungible commodity, 
such as grain, wheat, fuels, or base metals.  Given the fungible nature of 
commodities, economies of scale result from the commingling of stored 
and transported deposits of like kind—it is in the interest of the 
warehouse and depositors that fungible goods be commingled for 
storage or transportation purposes.  Indeed, perhaps the apotheosis of 
homogenous, fungible commodities exists in the energy industry.  In its 
purest form, natural gas is almost 100% methane.  Methane is a 
chemical compound of indistinguishable carbon and hydrogen particles.  
This atomic homogeneity posed no problem for the Third Circuit when 
it recognized the Federal Power Commission’s point that “the mere 
physical commingling of [one party’s] gas in [another’s] lines . . . does 
not compel rejection of historic notions of bailments . . . .”46 
Similarly, the fungible nature of grain means that economies of 
scale result from the commingling of stored deposits of like quality—it 
is also in the interests of grain warehouses and depositors that equal 
quality grain be commingled for storage purposes.  Dollars are also 
fungible goods; indeed, the very concept of “money” presupposes 
perfect homogeneity.  And, as most depositors likely understand, dollar 
deposits are commingled within the bank.  As above, the degree to 
which deposits are fungible or commingled is not relevant for purposes 
of the bailment/loan dilemma, as is sufficiently well-illustrated in the 
grain deposit context, notwithstanding the apparent widespread belief 
that commingling is critical to the bailment/loan determination in the 
banking context.47  This point is understood by the numerous state 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 371 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 
1967). 
 47. See, e.g., In re Nat Warren Contracting Co., 905 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1990); 
Hossain v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 15 F. App’x 745, 748 (10th Cir. 2001); and 
United States v. $3,000 In Cash, 906 F.Supp. 1061, 1070 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
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legislatures48 that have enacted the general UCC principle that “fungible 
goods [that] are commingled . . . are owned in common by the persons 
entitled thereto.”49  The fact of commingling poses no practical 
difficulty for the law of bailments, whether in the commodity or 
monetary context, and the need for banks to commingle monetary 
deposits is insufficient to warrant the default loan classification.50 
Further, in the event that the amount of a particular fungible good 
actually stored does not reconcile with the sum of the amount 
purportedly stored as indicated by all outstanding warehouse receipts, 
something untoward must have occurred—i.e., natural decay or disaster, 
or something more nefarious such as conversion, embezzlement, or 
fraud by the warehouse operator or its agents.51  In the first case, 
depending upon the nature of the agreement apportioning the risk of loss 
as between the parties, the individual grain depositors may be liable to 
bear the loss pro rata;52 but, in the latter case, the warehouse operator or 
somebody else would have committed a crime.53  As such, the law of 
bailments is well-suited to apportion liability for loss in the 
commingling context, regardless of whether such commingled items are 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-7-207(b) (West 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 60-02-25 (West 2013); WIS. STAT ANN. § 407.207(2) (West 2012); and MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 400.7-207(2) (West 2013), among others. 
 49. U.C.C. § 7-207(b) (2012), among others. 
 50. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 248 (2012) (“In general [a] warehouse operator may 
commingle agricultural products. . . . A warehouse operator shall be severally liable to 
each depositor . . . to the same extent and under the same circumstances as if the 
agricultural products had been stored separately.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 696 F.2d 528, 540 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding 
that conversion is an appropriate remedy where a grain elevator wrongfully took 
property owned by the plaintiff bailors). 
 52. See, e.g., United States v. Luther, 225 F.2d 499, 505 (10th Cir. 1955) (storage 
claimants that are tenants in common are entitled to their pro rata share of the 
remaining grain in storage); Dole v. Olmstead, 36 Ill. 150, 154–55 (1864) (where an 
undifferentiated mass of fungible goods is totally or partially lost or destroyed, all 
depositors are liable to sustain pro rata any loss which may occur by diminution or 
decay). 
 53. See, e.g., TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 14.073(a)(1) (West 2013) (“A person 
commits an offense if [he]: . . . (1) issues or aids in issuing a receipt or scale weight 
ticket knowing that the grain covered by the receipt or scale weight ticket has not been 
actually received at the grain warehouse.”); see also, State v. Deutsch, 77 N.J.L. 292, 
298 (Sup. Ct. 1909) (stating that “[i]n order to sustain a conviction it was necessary to 
prove not only that [the defendant] was a bailee of [plaintiff], and that he converted 
[plaintiff’s] money to his own use, but that he did it fraudulently”). 
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agricultural goods, industrial goods, or money.  Here again, the fungible 
nature of money and the need for banks to commingle dollars are 
insufficient to warrant the default classification of ordinary monetary 
deposits as loans. 
The above analysis touches on the similarities between bank 
deposits and the deposit of fungible goods.  However, the nuances of the 
legal relationship that exists between a depositor of fungible goods and a 
warehouse operator, as well as the rights of third parties to whom 
instruments such as warehouse receipts may have been negotiated, are 
well explored and thoroughly understood by all parties involved.  To be 
sure, such established law simply and accurately reflects the 
understanding that any reasonable party could be expected to have. 
Ultimately, the commercial and economic similarities between a 
deposit of dollars in a bank and a deposit of fungible commodities in a 
warehouse yield the conclusion that there is no apparent legal or 
practical justification for a default rule treating the former as a loan and 
the latter as a bailment.  In all practical regards, the nature of each 
transaction is the same.  Indeed, innumerable commodities have served 
as “money” in many historical contexts, thus pre-empting the red-
herring argument that there is a meaningful difference between “money” 
and such commodities that serves as a justification for the default legal 
classification of dollar deposits as loans. 
IV. FRACTIONAL RESERVE BANKING 
Part I illustrated the confusion inherent in the 19th and early 20th 
century case law that dealt with the legal status of ordinary bank 
deposits.  That part also demonstrated that by the 20th century, most 
courts and state legislatures had settled the bailment-loan dilemma by 
declaring deposits to be loans, in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary.  Part II explained that such courts and legislatures reached the 
conclusions set forth in Part I based upon a deficient understanding of 
the legal nature of bailments.  In effect, courts and legislatures 
concluded that because currency deposits were commingled, they could 
not legally be bailments.  But, Part III demonstrated that the law of 
bailments is capable of handling the legal and property issues that arise 
in the context of commingled goods deposits, belying the ostensible 
justifications for the juridical and legislative conclusions described in 
Part II.  In summary, by the early 20th century, courts and legislatures 
across the nation concluded that currency deposits must be loans 
because they could not legally be bailments; but, as shown above, a 
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simple analysis of the law of bailments rebuts this legal conclusion.  
Thus, if the conclusion obviously cannot be justified on legal grounds, 
why were such courts and legislatures intent on reaching it?  One way of 
explaining the conclusion is to examine the realities of modern banking 
both at present and in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Generally, modern banking techniques classify deposited funds 
(already, for the most part, classified as “general deposits,” i.e., loans to 
the bank, as opposed to “special deposits,” i.e., bailments) as “time 
deposits” or “demand deposits.”  The distinction defines the legal and 
contractual restrictions on depositors’ withdrawal rights.  Demand 
deposits, for example, impose virtually no restrictions on depositors, and 
must be repaid promptly following receipt of notice of demand for 
repayment.54  Time deposits, conversely, frequently include savings 
accounts, certificates of deposit, and other deposits payable after a 
specified period of time.55  Time deposits may be repaid more promptly 
than specified by law; however, banks may postpone repayment for a 
statutorily-defined (or contractually-defined) period of time.  Specific, 
general, demand, and time deposits encompass different legal and 
practical relationships that define the respective rights and obligations of 
depositors and banks in connection with deposited funds.56  But both 
demand deposits and time deposits are (or, in the case of time deposits, 
were) subject to fractional reserve requirements; i.e., regulations 
imposed by the Federal Reserve Act in the case of nationally chartered 
banks, and applicable state law in the case of all other banks, that 
require banks to maintain a percentage of demand deposits and a lesser 
percentage (or no percentage) of time deposits in the form of reserves.57 
                                                                                                                 
 54. For example, in Delaware repayment must be made within thirty days. DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 907(a) (West 2014).  In New York, repayment must be made within 
fourteen days. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 2(13) (McKinney 2014).  For practical purposes, 
demand deposits are usually paid immediately, although they need not be. 
 55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 907(a) (2013). 
 56. This Article deals primarily with ordinary “demand deposits,” but the essence 
of the analysis applies in any context in which a bank retains only a fraction of a type of 
deposits. 
 57. 12 C.F.R. § 204.5(a)(1) (2013); see also, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE, DIVISION OF CONSUMER AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, Regulation D: 
Reserve Requirements, in CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 1 & n.2 (2011), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SupManual/default.htm (“All 
depository institutions, including commercial banks [and] savings banks . . . are subject 
to reserve requirements. Institutions must satisfy reserve requirements by holding cash 
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More specifically, modern banking techniques depend critically 
upon the classification of ordinary consumer and corporate deposits as 
loans, and the money supply depends critically upon these modern 
banking techniques.58  Stated otherwise, modern banks are in the 
business of making loans using, inter alia, money deposited by ordinary 
depositors, and these loans augment the money supply.  To a certain 
extent, this is an oversimplification since banks can obtain the funds 
they need to make loans from a variety of sources, ordinary bank 
deposits among them, and the Federal Reserve also can alter the money 
supply through open market operations and the federal funds rate.59  In 
any event, the money supply can be expanded at a rate roughly inverse 
to the portion of all deposits that are not subsequently used to make new 
loans—at a rate inverse to the fractional reserve requirements imposed 
by law.60  For purposes of this Article, however, the fraction of deposits 
that a bank is legally required to maintain in the form of reserves is 
irrelevant.  Rather, the very concept of legal reserve requirements 
presupposes that a certain supplementary fraction of each bank’s 
deposits will not be held in reserve, and that such fraction of deposits 
will be used by banks in their discretion and possibly contrary to the 
intentions of a substantial portion of depositors.  This process, known as 
fractional reserve banking, is the de facto standard for all modern banks. 
Thus, the growth of the money supply depends in part upon the 
ability of banks to make loans, which, in turn, depends in no small part 
on the availability of deposited funds for such purposes; and, if 
deposited funds were treated as bailments, then they would be wholly-
unavailable to banks for lending purposes.  Surely, such obvious 
practical difficulties weighed heavily on courts and legislatures during 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries when the default legal 
classification of bank deposits began to emerge.  We can presume that 
                                                                                                                 
in their vaults or, if vault cash is insufficient, as a balance in account at a Federal 
Reserve Bank.”). 
 58. See generally JOSHUA N. FEINMAN, RESERVE REQUIREMENTS:  HISTORY, 
CURRENT PRACTICE, AND POTENTIAL REFORM (1993), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/0693lead.pdf. 
 59. See generally BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 27–50 (9th ed. 2005) 
[hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf. 
 60. But see PAUL SHEARD, STANDARD & POOR’S ECONOMIC RESEARCH, REPEAT 
AFTER ME:  BANKS CANNOT AND DO NOT “LEND OUT” RESERVES 7 (2013) (arguing 
that deposits are created by loans, not the other way around). 
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courts and legislatures near the dawn of the 20th century were well 
aware that any holding or legislation that classified ordinary bank 
deposits as bailments would profoundly disrupt the banking system that 
already treated them as loans. 
V. RESERVE REQUIREMENTS, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, AND THE RACE TO 
THE BOTTOM 
Part IV argued that 19th and 20th century banking practices, both 
local and national, were the actual impetus for courts and legislatures to 
fashion a de jure justification for a de facto business practice.  The result 
was the creation of the legal framework essential to the modern 
fractional reserve banking system, and, arguably, the beginning of the 
end of sound money.  Economic consequences aside, however, the 
default legal classification of deposits as bailments had an enormous 
practical consequence: it eliminated categorically the market for 100% 
reserve banks and for banks that maintained any reserves substantially in 
excess of legal requirements.  Minimum reserve requirements 
established by applicable law do not prohibit banks from maintaining all 
of their demand deposits in the form of reserves; however, as a practical 
matter, no bank will maintain 100% reserves if any competing banks 
operate with less than full reserves and are the beneficiaries of a deposit 
insurance system subsidized by all banks.  The essence of this point is 
essential to the Article and thus an example is appropriate. 
Suppose “Ant Bank” agrees to maintain 100% of its demand 
deposits in the form of reserves, and that “Grasshopper Bank” agrees to 
maintain only 50% of its demand deposits in the form of reserves; i.e., 
Grasshopper Bank is a fractional reserve bank.  Suppose further that 
Grasshopper Bank, in order to induce depositors to make demand 
deposits, uses the half of its demand deposits not maintained as reserves 
to lend, invest, or speculate, and that the interest payments, dividends, 
and profits earned from such lending, investing, or speculating are used 
in part to pay interest to depositors on their demand deposits.  Note that, 
without the opportunity to earn interest on demand deposit balances, no 
rational actor would deposit funds with Grasshopper Bank as long as 
Ant Bank remains a viable alternative.61  The interest payments are 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Today, as a result of deposit insurance, Ant Bank is no longer a viable 
alternative since no depositor actually bears any risk of loss (at least up to the $250,000 
per account insurable limit).  Ironically, deposit insurance relieves Grasshopper Bank of 
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compensation to Grasshopper Bank’s depositors for their assumption of 
the risk that Grasshopper Bank may fail to repay all or a portion of its 
demand deposits (either as a consequence of a mismatch between 
deposit withdrawal requests, on the one hand, and available cash 
reserves plus liquidity from underlying loans and investments, on the 
other; or, worse, a default or loss on such loans or investments).62  
Assume that Ant Bank and Grasshopper Bank are identical in all other 
respects. 
In this simple hypothetical, some portion of depositors would 
choose to deposit their funds in Ant Bank and others would choose to 
deposit their funds in Grasshopper Bank.  Much would depend on the 
rate of interest paid by Grasshopper Bank on demand deposit balances, 
and it is not unreasonable to assume that many depositors would 
maintain demand deposit balances at both banks, in accordance with 
each depositor’s respective appetite for savings versus investment.63  
However, if we further suppose that government-sponsored deposit 
“insurance” exists—insurance provided by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)—the outcome of the above 
hypothetical changes dramatically.64  If the entirety of Ant Bank’s and 
Grasshopper Bank’s demand deposits are insured, and assuming that 
each bank complies with the insuring entity’s reserve requirements, then 
interest payments to Grasshopper Bank’s depositors constitute a 
windfall, i.e., a reward without the corresponding assumption of 
counterparty risk.  Further, if each bank pays a “premium” to the 
insuring entity in exchange for deposit “insurance,” then Ant Bank’s 
depositors are subsidizing the risk-seeking behavior of Grasshopper 
Bank’s depositors, assuming that each bank passes the cost of insurance 
                                                                                                                 
the obligation to pay interest on its deposits, at least to the extent that interest payments 
compensate depositors for assuming the risk of loss. 
 62. Ant Bank’s depositors, conversely, are not subject to any counterparty risk 
because Ant Bank is not a fractional reserve bank; i.e., there is no possibility of an 
uncovered bank run, tautologically.  Accordingly, Ant Bank would not have any 
incentive to pay, and Ant Bank’s depositors would not have any reason to require, 
interest on demand deposit balances.  This comports, of course, with the theory that 
interest payments partially constitute compensation for foregoing current 
consumption—demand deposits can be demanded at any time, and thus do not 
constitute the sacrifice of current consumption in any substantive sense. 
 63. By hypothesis, all of the demand deposits deposited in Ant Bank constitute 
savings; whereas 50% of the demand deposits deposited in Grasshopper Bank constitute 
savings, the other half constituting indirect investment. 
 64. See Part VI below for a discussion regarding deposit insurance. 
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premiums to its respective depositors.65  In effect, the insuring entity 
guarantees the demand deposit balances of both banks, but only 
Grasshopper Bank pays its depositors interest on their demand deposit 
balances.  The obvious result is that depositors will remove their funds 
from Ant Bank and deposit them in Grasshopper Bank, or that Ant Bank 
will begin paying interest on its demand deposit balances, which would 
require it to engage in lending, investment, or speculation (i.e., to cease 
operating as a 100% reserve bank). 
Additionally, because the insuring entity guarantees deposit 
balances, all insured banks have an incentive to invest or lend all (or a 
substantial majority of) demand deposits not legally required to be held 
as reserves, irrespective of the quality of the underlying investments or 
loans.  In effect, every interest payment received or dividend earned by a 
bank constitutes a net gain to the bank’s managers and shareholders 
whether or not the underlying borrower defaults or the underlying 
investment declines.  A portion of such gains are passed on to depositors 
in the form of interest in exchange for providing the capital (deposits) 
for these loans and investments, wittingly or otherwise.  The above 
dynamic results in a situation in which all banks strive to maintain no 
more than that fraction of demand deposits required to be held as 
reserves pursuant to applicable law.  The result is, in normal economic 
circumstances, a race to lend or invest as quickly and haphazardly as 
possible.  The data bear this out, as illustrated by Figure 1.  Figure 1 
compares aggregate reserves actually maintained by insured depository 
institutions relative to reserves required to be maintained by these 
institutions pursuant to applicable laws and regulations. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 65. If the cost of deposit insurance premiums is not passed on to depositors, then 
Ant Bank’s managers (or shareholders) are effectively subsidizing Grasshopper Bank’s 
managers (or shareholders). 
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Figure 166 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Four relevant conclusions follow.  First, assuming the absence of 
deposit insurance, all banks will operate either as 100%-reserve banks or 
as fractional reserve banks.  The former are in effect money warehouses 
and presumably would provide ordinary banking services such as 
checking and ATM access, etc., for which depositors would be assessed 
a small periodic fee.  Additionally, depositors would not earn interest on 
their deposit balances, and would not be exposed to the possibility of 
default by the bank.67  Fractional reserve banks, conversely, would pay 
interest on demand deposit balances as a form of compensation for the 
use of a fraction of such deposits for investment or lending purposes and 
the risks associated therewith; also, they likely would provide the above-
mentioned ordinary banking services.  Second, assuming the existence 
of system-wide deposit insurance, all banks will operate as fractional 
reserve banks, and the assumption that all deposit balances will yield 
interest no longer obtains, since depositors do not bear the risk of loss of 
their deposits.  Third, absent some exogenous variable, all banks will 
maintain only those reserves that they are required by law to maintain 
(as evidenced by the nearly parallel lines in Figure 1).68  Fourth, 
fractional reserve banking implies the bank-as-debtor and depositor-as-
                                                                                                                 
 66. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Aggregate Reserves of 
Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base, available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/default.htm, (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
 67. Assuming the bank was operating lawfully; i.e., actually maintaining 100% of 
its deposits in the form of reserves (or, more to the point, acting as a lawful bailee). 
 68. Data from 2008 through the present show a dramatic increase in actual reserves 
relative to required reserves (not depicted in Figure 1).  The discrepancy is the result of 
various economic stimulus programs designed to increase bank assets coupled with the 
resulting reluctance of such banks to increase lending, the original intent of such 
economic stimulus programs notwithstanding. See supra Figure 1. 
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creditor relationship; whereas 100% reserve banking implies that 
depositors are bailors and banks are bailees of deposits. 
With these conclusions in mind, note that the hypothesis that 
depositors will patronize fractional reserve banks only if they are 
compensated for the risk of loss69 presupposes that the there is an 
alternative—that 100% reserve banks will not lend or invest any portion 
of their deposit balances, as would be expected in a bailor-bailee 
relationship.  This is the logical equivalent of supposing that there exists 
a realistic option to bank pursuant to a debtor-creditor relationship or 
pursuant to a bailor-bailee relationship.  But, in today’s economy, 
bailor-bailee banking relationships and 100% reserve banks do not 
exist.70  This comports with the explanation that deposit insurance 
excludes 100% reserve banks from the market.  In effect, why not enter 
into a debtor-creditor relationship if the government guarantees the 
debt?  Thus, the default legal classification of ordinary deposits as loans 
instead of bailments established the legal framework for the modern 
fractional reserve banking system.  Subsequently, the creation of 
systematic deposit insurance drove 100% reserve banks from the 
market. 
VI. SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
To summarize, the default legal classification of ordinary bank 
deposits as loans, as described in Part I, was based on the erroneous 
legal conclusion that commingled bank deposits could not be bailments, 
as described in Part II.  Part III debunked this erroneous legal 
conclusion; and Part IV illustrated that prevailing banking practices in 
the 19th and 20th centuries were the actual impetus for courts and 
legislatures to fashion the default legal classification.  A primary 
consequence of this legal framework was the rapid expansion of 
fractional reserve banking together with the development of systematic 
deposit insurance, as detailed in Part V.  Thus, the legal classification of 
ordinary bank deposits as loans instead of bailments resulted in the 
universal expansion of fractional reserve banking together with its 
                                                                                                                 
 69. I.e., only if their deposit balances earn interest. 
 70. Depositing money in a safe deposit box would be a clear example of a bailment 
between a depositor and a bank, but this relationship does not share any of the 
characteristics of banking, per se. 
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crucial governmental support, deposit insurance.  This Part discusses 
several possible consequences of these developments 
Specifically, several adverse social, political, and economic 
consequences are reasonably attributable to the misclassification of 
ordinary demand deposits as loans instead of bailments.  These 
consequences include: (i) the mischaracterization of deposit guarantees 
as “insurance” instead of transfer payments; (ii) bank runs that, but-for 
fractional reserve banking, could not occur; (iii) suboptimal lending and 
investment through surreptitious social policy masquerading as private 
enterprise; (iv) moral hazard and subsidization of risky lending and 
investment; and (v) the devaluation of money through inflation. 
A. DEPOSIT GUARANTEES: INSURANCE OR TRANSFER PAYMENTS? 
The true legal nature of the depositor-bank relationship is of critical 
importance in the event of bank insolvency.  Under such circumstances, 
depositors are confronted with the startling reality that, as unintended 
creditors of the bank, the law places the full risk of loss on them.  In this 
context, as in many normal debtor-creditor relationships, depositors may 
be forced to bear the full cost of investment failure by their respective 
banks; i.e., they bear the risk of default.  The extent of depositors’ 
participation in the realized gains of the bank takes the form of interest 
payments on deposits, which if paid at all, are only loosely correlated 
with the performance of the bank’s underlying loan and investment 
portfolio and the bank’s risk of default.71  Viewed in this light, the risk 
and cost of insolvency of a particular bank might be justified in the case 
of an informed depositor in light of the countervailing interest earned on 
her deposit; but it is not clear how to justify subjecting an ordinary 
depositor to the risk of financial loss if such depositor is not even aware 
that she is a creditor.72  This helps to explain the creation of federal 
deposit insurance, which arose as a direct consequence of the anomalous 
legal classification of an ordinary demand deposit as a loan. 
In order to perpetuate the widespread but inaccurate belief that 
depositors retain title to deposited funds, such funds must be available 
for withdrawal on demand.  When such funds are not available for 
immediate withdrawal, the FDIC steps in as a receiver for the bank, 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See JOHN H. MALKIN, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
RESEARCH:  WHAT DETERMINES INTEREST RATES (2005), available at 
http://www.aei.org/files/2005/01/01/20041222_17755graphics.pdf. 
 72. Even ignoring the existence of deposit insurance. 
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liquidates its assets, and returns deposited funds to depositors.  
However, the history of the FDIC illustrates that too frequently its assets 
are insufficient to bail out insured institutions.  This fact—that the 
cumulative total of premiums paid by functional banks is frequently 
insufficient to cover insured deposits of failed banks (particularly during 
a recession)—is a reflection of an underlying possibility: bank losses 
that accrue as a result of loans or investments made on misclassified 
deposits may be caused by such legal misclassification and, as such, are 
not insurable events.  Figure 2, infra, depicts historical FDIC asset 
balances (reserve fund amounts available to cover insured deposit 
losses) as a percent of corresponding aggregate insured deposits. 
 
Figure 273 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The shortfalls in 1991 and again between 2008 and 2010 suggest 
that losses on loans and investments made using misclassified deposits 
are not insurable events.74  Alarmingly, negative values represent 
periods during which the FDIC lacked sufficient assets to cover actual 
losses on insured deposits.  Thus, then-FDIC Chairwoman Sheila Bair’s 
statement, in a November 17, 2009 press release, that “[t]he FDIC was 
created specifically for times like these.  Our resources are strong,”75 is 
                                                                                                                 
 73. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 114 
(2013), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2012annualreport/ 
AR12final.pdf. 
 74. Id.  Since 2008, the FDIC has fallen well short of its designated reserve ratios 
of 1.25% through 2010 and 2% thereafter. Deposit Insurance Management Fund, 
FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/fund.html (last updated June 17, 2013). 
 75. Press release, FDIC, No Safer Place for Your Money: Why the FDIC’s 
Resources Are Strong and Insured Deposits Are “Absolutely Safe” (Nov. 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09210.html [hereinafter No 
Safer Place for Your Money]. 
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difficult to reconcile with the FDIC’s almost $21 billion deficit at the 
end of 2009.76  Of course, to perpetuate the conflict between depositors’ 
unconditional demand for immediate access to deposited funds and the 
default legal classification that such deposits are loans, depositors 
cannot be required to bear the consequences of such insurance fund 
deficiencies.77  Along those lines, then-Chairwoman Bair in the same 
press release stated that the “FDIC fully guarantees [depositors’] insured 
deposits and provides them with seamless access to their money.  For 
the insured depositor, a bank failure is a non-event.”78 
However, with banks continuing to fail and the FDIC suffering 
substantial deficits, the FDIC had no choice but to replenish its reserve 
fund to ensure that such bank failures would actually be “non-events” 
for depositors.  Supporting the conclusion that deposit insurance is not 
actually insurance, the FDIC amended “its assessment regulations to 
require insured [banks] to prepay” regular risk-based assessments three 
years in advance, effective as of December 30, 2009.79  At the time, the 
FDIC expected that its mandatory prepayment program would add $45 
billion to its reserve fund.80  For purposes of this Article, however, the 
relevant consideration is whether an economic transaction that requires 
the prepayment of future premiums in order to compensate for past 
losses (as distinguished from current premiums to cover expected future 
losses) properly can be classified as insurance.81  It cannot.82  At the risk 
                                                                                                                 
 76. FDIC, STATISTICS AT A GLANCE:  HISTORICAL TRENDS (2013), available at 
www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2013jun/fdic.pdf. 
 77. As should be obvious, the reason this situation is a conflict is because creditors 
cannot require the repayment of a loan “on demand.”  By definition, an economic 
transaction in which a creditor can demand the return of “credited” goods immediately 
is a bailment, not a loan.  This point is not harmed by conditions within a borrower’s 
ostensible control (or at least outside of creditors’ control) the occurrence of which may 
require the immediate repayment of credited funds, such as the failure to make periodic 
payments or to reach certain milestones (as in the construction lending industry). 
 78. See No Safer Place for Your Money, supra note 75. 
 79. 12 C.F.R. § 327.12 (2013). 
 80. Press release, FDIC, FDIC Board Approves Final Rule on Prepaid Assessments 
(Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09203.html 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2013).  Approximately $46 billion ultimately was paid. 
Memorandum from Arthur J. Murton (Director of Division of Insurance and Research) 
to FDIC Board of Directors, 2 (June 8, 2010), available at 
www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/memo3.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
 81. The FDIC apparently viewed mandatory “prepayment [as] preferable to 
borrowing from [the] Treasury,” which “could risk diminishing public confidence in the 
FDIC and in insured [banks].” FDIC, 12 C.F.R. PART 327:  PREPAID ASSESSMENTS 20 
(2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2009nov12no4.pdf (last visited 
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of belaboring the point, the fact that FDIC assets are frequently 
insufficient to cover bank losses is likely not a failure of actuarial 
calculations.  The FDIC’s actuaries, much to their credit, try futilely to 
calculate insurance premiums for seemingly uninsurable events: losses 
that may be caused proximately by the legal misclassification of 
ordinary deposits as loans instead of bailments.83 
All of this illustrates the critical role played by deposit insurance in 
maintaining the illusion that a deposit is a loan and simultaneously a 
bailment, an illusion that the law resolves unequivocally in favor of 
banks—an ordinary deposit is a loan, absent agreement to the contrary.84  
However, in order to preserve the quantity of deposited funds available 
to banks for lending and investment, depositors must believe they 
always have access to deposited funds on demand.  If depositors 
assumed the risk of loss (if they might not have access to deposited 
funds on demand), they would not deposit their funds in fractional 
reserve banks, or else, as explained above, would demand substantially 
higher interest payments to compensate for their assumption of the risk 
of loss (i.e., to compensate them for the risk of the real economic 
transaction into which they enter—lending).  Deposit insurance 
perpetuates this illusion by providing depositors with access to their 
funds even though such depositors’ banks have lost the deposited funds 
via bad loans or investments. 
B. BANK RUNS, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, AND CIRCULAR REASONING 
If case law (and statutory law) paralleled the understanding held by 
ordinary depositors regarding the status of their ordinary deposits, bank 
runs could not occur and, as a consequence, deposit insurance would 
                                                                                                                 
Nov. 5, 2013).  It’s not clear to this author how the FDIC’s decision to require its 
regulated counterparts to pre-pay arbitrary fees in order to balance the FDIC’s books is 
more or less dubious—from a public confidence perspective—than borrowing the same 
amount from the Treasury. Id. 
 82. See infra Part VI. 
 83. “The FDIC has already increased annual assessment rates uniformly by 3 basis 
points beginning in 2011, based on the FDIC’s long term projections for the DIF and 
liquidity needs and to ensure that the fund reserve ratio returns to 1.15 percent within 
the statutorily mandated eight years.” FDIC, 12 C.F.R. PART 327:  PREPAID 
ASSESSMENTS, 24 (Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/ 
2009nov12no4.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
 84. Thompson v. Riggs, 72 U.S. 663, 678 (1866). 
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serve no purpose.  If banks properly classified deposits according to the 
intentions of their depositors, then each deposit would consist of two 
explicit components: special deposits and the complementary portion 
consisting of general deposits.  The sum of the amount classified as 
special deposits plus the sum of the amount classified as general 
deposits would, by definition, equal 100% of the amounts deposited.  
Under this system, by classifying a deposit as a general deposit available 
to the bank for subsequent lending, the purchase of securities, or 
otherwise (and not as a special deposit to be stored securely as a 
bailment), the depositor would necessarily understand that such deposit 
is exposed to possible losses.85  By implication, the depositor’s 
intentions with respect to the remainder of the deposit (i.e., the amount 
classified as a special deposit) would be honored.  To be sure, the 
fraction of special deposits “matched” by reserves would always be 
100%.86  The essential point is that the depositor would make the 
distinction as to the fraction of the deposit that is “savings” (and, thus, to 
be entrusted to the bank’s vault) and the fraction of the deposit that is 
not “savings” (and which may be loaned or invested by the bank or 
otherwise used in the bank’s discretion). 
Accordingly, the very reason for deposit insurance (the 
establishment of a pool of assets funded by premiums87 paid by banks 
and available to compensate depositors in the event of a bank run) 
would be eliminated.  There could not be any bank runs, at least not any 
for which the bank did not have adequate corresponding reserves on 
hand.  The proposition is quite simple: if courts enforce the property 
rights and contractual rights of depositors as commonly understood by 
depositors, uncovered bank runs would be eliminated and there would 
                                                                                                                 
 85. This Article assumes that a substantial portion of depositors, if given the 
opportunity to classify their deposits as bailments or loans, would understand that loans 
could be subject to financial losses.  However, it is no counterargument that some 
depositors might not understand that the fraction of their deposits classified as loans 
would be subject to possible financial losses.  To the extent that counterargument is 
true, it applies equally to the widespread public sale of debt or equity securities 
generally.  One could imagine the development of a plethora of investment products 
designed to cater to the various risk and investing styles of the bank’s customers – 
perhaps something akin to modern bonds and/or mortgage-backed securities. 
 86. If the bank did not have 100% of its “savings deposits” in the form of reserves 
then something untoward must have occurred, i.e., theft in one or more myriad forms, 
or destruction such as by fire or natural disaster. 
 87. As discussed throughout this Article, it is telling that the reserves in deposit 
insurance fund are frequently insufficient to cover losses during economic recessions. 
572 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XIX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
be no need for deposit insurance.88  Indeed, if banks treated the deposits 
entrusted to them by their clients in accordance with their clients’ 
intentions (as bailments), an awkward conversation would ensue if a 
bank tried to insure its deposits against embezzlement or conversion by 
bank officials.89 
C. ARTIFICIAL CREDIT CREATION AND SUBOPTIMAL INVESTMENT AND 
LENDING 
As explained in Part II, the default legal classification of a bank 
deposit as a loan results in a transfer of title from the depositor to the 
bank.  With this transfer of title comes the normal legal accoutrements, 
in particular the right of the bank to use deposited funds at its discretion.  
Invariably, since banks, like all businesses, are interested in turning a 
profit, each bank faces a nearly irresistible temptation to exercise such 
discretion and use its deposited funds to make loans to third parties,90 
purchase investments, or otherwise engage in speculative business 
activities.  This is the fractional reserve banking process, and it 
contributes to the artificial expansion of the nation’s available credit.  
But increasing the nation’s money supply through credit creation 
fostered by the fractional reserve banking process is not merely a 
curious consequence of the debtor-creditor banking relationship that is 
the subject of this Article: increasing the nation’s money supply through 
this artificial credit creation process is the purpose and the most 
important consequence of the fractional reserve system.91  The problem, 
                                                                                                                 
 88. To clarify, this Article takes the position that banks are likely aware that most 
of their depositors have little understanding of the banking process in general, and that, 
specifically, such depositors do not understand that their deposits will be loaned or 
invested by banks.  This raises interesting questions about the origin of legislation 
codifying the opposite of common, public understanding.  However, whether depositors 
know that their deposits may be used by banks for lending and investment is irrelevant. 
 89. This assessment does not apply to forms of insurance designed to mitigate 
losses in connection with third party actions or “natural” losses; e.g., a smoothly 
operating marketplace might involve the sale of fire-protection insurance to banks, the 
cost of which might be passed on to the bank’s depositors. 
 90. The bank profits by charging a rate of interest on its loans that exceeds the rate 
of interest its pays, if any, with respect to funds in its deposit account. 
 91. PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE MORAL HAZARD IMPLICATIONS OF DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE:  THEORY AND EVIDENCE, 4, 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2006/mfl/pam.pdf (“The unstable balance 
sheet of banks is not a quirk.  Rather, it is inherent to a key economic function of banks, 
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however, is that the only inherent restriction on prudent lending and 
investment that exists in the bailment context is entirely absent in the 
fractional reserve context.  That restriction (the classification of an 
ordinary deposit as a bailment) would require each bank to handle 
deposits according to the intentions of depositors.  Having been relieved 
of such responsibility, there is nothing inherent in the current legal 
relationship between a bank and its depositors that serves to encourage 
prudent lending and investment.  This void helps to explain the dizzying 
array of federal and state banking regulations, each of which presumably 
is intended to induce prudent banking and lending activities—prudence 
that would exist if ordinary deposits were classified as bailments, not 
loans.92 
Accordingly, regulators are forced to contend with and preempt the 
harmful consequences of a banking process that would not give rise to 
such consequences if ordinary deposits were classified in accordance 
with depositors’ intentions.  Such regulations include, generally, 
complex and burdensome restrictions on entry, “activity restrictions, 
prophylactic rules, examinations, and sanctions”93 and, more 
specifically, “monitoring by state and federal regulators . . . [and] 
regulatory devices such as lending limits, minimum capital 
requirements, restrictions on insider dealings, and restrictions on 
competition among firms.”94  An example of such regulations include 
seemingly prudent restrictions on investment contained in applicable 
bank regulations, typified by the following: “the business of dealing in 
securities and stock by [banks] shall be limited to purchasing and selling 
such securities and stock . . . [for] customers, and in no case for its own 
account.” 95  But even this seemingly-salutary attempt to induce prudent 
                                                                                                                 
which is providing financial liquidity.  As financial intermediaries, banks accept liquid 
deposits from the public and reinvest those funds in long-term, illiquid loans . . . . 
Banks have confidence that they can actually honor depositors’ demands based on the 
principle of fractional reserves.”). 
 92. Perhaps this issue will be the topic of another Article; however, I don’t hesitate 
to observe that such myriad regulations seem to cause many more problems than they 
resolve. 
 93. MCCOY, supra note 91, at 10 (arguing that deposit insurance is not really 
insurance because it does not guard against a defined, preventable loss). 
 94. Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors:  
A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 220 
(1998) [hereinafter Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors]. 
 95. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (2012). 
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lending and investment is obviated by exceptions in the very same 
paragraph: 
The limitations . . . contained [in this section] . . . shall not apply to 
obligations of the United States, or general obligations of any State 
or of any political subdivision thereof, . . . instruments of or issued 
by the Federal National Mortgage Association, or the Government 
National Mortgage Association, or mortgages, obligations or other 
securities which are or ever have been sold by the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation pursuant to Section 305 or Section 306 
of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act . . . [or] 
securities that . . . are offered and sold pursuant to section 4(5) of the 
Securities Act of 193396 . . . or . . . mortgage related securities.97 
Permitting banks to purchase the debt of government-sponsored 
enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is an exception that 
swallows a rule designed ostensibly to reduce risk. 
In addition, notwithstanding the restrictions on investment and 
lending codified in applicable banking regulations,98 policymakers 
enacted exemptions for loans collateralized by real estate, including 
residential mortgage backed securities: “[a]ny national [bank] may 
make, arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by . 
. . real estate.”99  This particular exemption has obvious consequences 
for government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.  These entities, by alleviating much of the risk borne by banks 
with respect to their loan portfolios, contributed to the drastic increase in 
suboptimal lending and inevitable residential mortgage foreclosures that 
defined the recent financial crisis.100  Moreover, the economic harm 
caused by such government-sponsored enterprises magnifies the 
underlying harm caused by the legal misclassification of ordinary bank 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 4(5), 48 Stat. 74 (“transactions involving offers or 
sales of one or more promissory notes directly secured by a first lien on a single parcel 
of real estate upon which is located a dwelling or other residential or commercial 
structure”). 
 97. 12 U.S.C. § 24.  “Mortgage related securities” are defined in 15 U.S.C. § 
78c(a)(41) (2012). 
 98. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24. 
 99. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2012). 
 100. See generally PETER J. WALLISON, DISSENT FROM THE MAJORITY REPORT OF 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION (2011) [hereinafter DISSENT FROM THE 
MAJORITY REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION], available at 
www.aei.org/files/2011/01/26/Wallisondissent.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
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deposits as loans instead of bailments.  As discussed above, the 
misclassification of ordinary bank deposits coupled with system-wide 
deposit insurance fosters a nearly irresistible incentive to engage in 
speculative lending and investment activities.  That incentive is 
enhanced by loan guarantees provided by government-sponsored 
enterprises.  As a result, few forces remain to impede the rapid 
expansion of credit, in part because credit expansion is the primary 
purpose of fractional reserve banking. 
More general political justifications for expanding the money 
supply through artificial credit creation are included in explicit federal 
regulations: “national [banks] . . . shall have power . . . to make 
investments directly or indirectly . . . to promote the public welfare, 
including the welfare of low- and moderate-income communities or 
families (such as by providing housing, services, or jobs).”101  Surely, 
such mandates played some role in the recent economic turmoil and 
government fiscal profligacy.  However, a bigger problem is embodied 
in the premise that greater access to artificial credit will “promote the 
public welfare.”  Although not within the scope of this Article, the 
economics of this proposition are dubious at best.  Nevertheless, from 
the proposition that courts should enforce depositors’ property rights 
and contractual rights (by classifying deposits according to depositors’ 
intentions), it does not follow that lending by banks would grind to a 
halt,102 or that no fraction of a bank’s deposits would be available for 
lending.  Indeed, the primary direct consequence of enforcing 
depositors’ rights would be the elimination of the discrepancy between 
the banks’ understanding and the depositors’ understanding of which 
deposits are available for lending or investment.  This, of course, would 
mean that depositors and not bankers would be the ultimate 
determinants of the amount of lending and investment undertaken by the 
society as a whole.103 
The allocation of responsibility between depositors, banks, or other 
third parties with respect to the type of lending and investment cannot be 
logically predicted using this framework.  It is reasonable to assume, as 
is already the case, that ordinary people would voluntarily abdicate at 
least a portion of such responsibility to trained investment professionals.  
                                                                                                                 
 101. 12 U.S.C. § 24. 
 102. It is likely the case, however, that the real amount of lending could be expected 
to decline, ceteris paribus. 
 103. Savings and investment are only identical as the percent of reserves maintained 
by fractional reserve banks approaches zero. 
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To be sure, the financial industry (and banks themselves) would have an 
interest in providing investment management services to depositors.  In 
any event, the legal misclassification of ordinary demand deposits as 
loans instead of bailments likely results in substantially more lending, as 
well as a different allocation of capital between types of loans and 
investments, than would otherwise occur. 
D. SURREPTITIOUS SOCIAL POLICY 
The temptation to policymakers to play social engineer is nearly 
irresistible, more so when the economic consequences of such 
engineering are not obvious.  For example, prior to the 2008 financial 
crisis, the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) “continue[d] to 
encourage [banks] to extend conventional prime lending to historically 
underserved segments of the market.”104  The CRA “encouraged” this 
economically-unsound behavior by utilizing the relevant enforcement 
provisions which, inter alia, permit federal regulators to “withhold 
approvals for such transactions as mergers and acquisitions and branch 
network expansion if [an] applying bank [does] not have a satisfactory 
CRA rating.”105  During the twenty-five years prior to the financial 
crisis, the CRA effectively forced banks to make loans to high-risk 
borrowers.  Setting aside the intentions behind, and consequences of,106 
this social policy, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that such risky 
lending would be possible at all without the legal misclassification of 
ordinary bank deposits as loans.  In effect, through legislation like the 
CRA, Congress induces banks to make loans they would not otherwise 
make using money that does not belong to them.  Why not simply 
require ordinary people to make loans directly to high-risk borrowers?  
Presumably, the political costs of such a direct approach would be less 
than salutary.  A healthy and well-functioning polity depends in part 
upon legislating social policy in a transparent manner.  In this regard, 
the misclassification of ordinary demand deposits contributes to the 
                                                                                                                 
 104. William C. Apgar & Mark Duda, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the 
Community Reinvestment Act:  Past Accomplishments & Future Regulatory 
Challenges, 9(2) FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.:  ECON. POL’Y REV. 169, 175 (2003), 
available at www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/03v09n2/0306apga.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2013). 
 105. See DISSENT FROM THE MAJORITY REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMMISSION, supra note 100, at 85. 
 106. See id. at 85–92. 
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corruption of the polity by facilitating the passage furtively of legislation 
that might not otherwise survive the democratic process. 
E. MORAL HAZARD AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM INSTABILITY 
Modern banks make loans and investments using deposited funds 
that are classified improperly as loans instead of bailments.  The 
depositors of these funds do not intend to lend or invest them (directly, 
or indirectly through bank intermediation) and, by implication, do not 
intend to expose them to the risk of loss.  Further, such depositors 
historically had an incentive to pay close attention to the financial 
integrity of the banks into which they deposited their funds.  They had 
an incentive to monitor the activities of such banks and to respond by 
withdrawing their deposited funds in the event of financial instability.  
Such monitoring led to bank runs upon the appearance, real or 
otherwise, of financial instability.107  However, the creation of federal 
deposit insurance obviated the need for depositors to monitor the 
financial integrity of their respective banks by seeming to eliminate the 
consequences to depositors of poor investment and lending by banks.  In 
this regard, deposit insurance transfers the risk of loss from the 
depositors to the shareholders of other banks (to the extent that they too 
contribute to the insurance fund) or to the monetary unit generally (to 
the extent that its value is diluted through the issuance of new monetary 
units to “cover” loan and investment losses).  The transfer of this risk is 
the quintessential “moral hazard problem of deposit insurance.”108  In 
other words, deposit insurance induces the same risky investment and 
lending that it is designed to insure against—it reduces the motive to 
prevent loss.109 
Of course, the problem of moral hazard in the general insurance 
context is well understood110—a random insurable event is more likely 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See Wally Suphap, Toward Effective Risk-Adjusted Bank Deposit Insurance:  A 
Transnational Strategy, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 829, 840–41 (1990) [hereinafter 
Suphap, Toward Effective Risk-Adjusted Bank Deposit Insurance]. 
 108. Deposit Insurance Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affair, 
108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Federal Reserve 
Board), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2003/ 
20030226/. 
 109. Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541, 541 
(1979). 
 110. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
237 (1996). 
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to occur after insurance against the underlying event is obtained.111  The 
general moral hazard analysis quickly leads to the banal observation that 
insured banks have an incentive to partake in speculative lending and 
investment activities because they do not bear all of the associated 
risks.112  But the problem of moral hazard in the deposit insurance 
context is worse than in the ordinary insurance context for at least three 
reasons.  For example, first, in the years leading up to the 2008 financial 
crisis, bank loans generated substantial profits to subprime lenders ab 
initio (through the prompt package and sale of these loans into pooled 
investment vehicles called mortgage-backed securities), thereby 
rewarding banks that were able to process large quantities of 
transactions without regard to quality.113  Second, the costs of deposit 
insurance are not adjusted to reflect the actual risk of the investment and 
lending activity of a given bank.114  As such, each bank “has an 
incentive to make risky loans that it would not make but for insurance.  
                                                                                                                 
 111. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, RISK, INCENTIVES AND INSURANCE:  THE PURE THEORY 
OF MORAL HAZARD 30 (1983), available at https://www.genevaassociation.org/ 
media/220469/GA1983_GP8(26)_Stiglitz.pdf (arguing that “the shift in the primary 
locus of . . . insurance . . . to the State, has undoubtedly been accompanied by an 
increase in the distortions and inefficiencies associated from what we have called the 
moral hazard problem”). 
 112. See J. Huston McCulloch, Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance, 59 J. BUS. 
79, 82 (1986) (arguing “[l]argely as a consequence of the federal deposit insurance 
umbrella, banks and thrifts have engaged with impunity in all manner of excessive 
risks”). 
 113. See DISSENT FROM THE MAJORITY REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMMISSION, supra note 100, at 54–55 (explaining that subprime loans were sold 
through “Wall Street underwriters to Fannie and Freddie, which became the largest 
buyers of these high-risk PMBS between 2002 and 2005”). 
 114. See Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, Does Deposit Insurance 
Increase Banking System Stability?, 49 J. MONETARY ECON. 1373 (2002); see also, 
Viral V. Acharya, João A. C. Santos, & Tanju Yorulmazer, Systemic Risk & Deposit 
Insurance Premiums, 16 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.: ECON. POL’Y REV. 89 (2010), 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/10v16n1/1008yoru.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2013); Suphap, Toward Effective Risk-Adjusted Bank Deposit 
Insurance, supra note 107, at 838 (pointing out that “the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 explicitly required the [FDIC] to adopt a risk-
based assessment system . . . [but] . . . the FDIC’s current authority to charge risk-
adjusted premiums has been heavily curtailed by the Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 
1996 . . . . As a result . . . over 90 percent of depositary institutions operating in the 
United States have avoided paying risk-adjusted premiums.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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Therefore, when the price of insurance is fixed, increasing the riskiness 
of the loan portfolio redounds primarily to the benefit of the residual 
claimants—bank stockholders.”115  Third, the fact that the deposit 
insurance scheme is run by government, as opposed to private 
companies, contributes to financial system instability by virtually 
eliminating the incentive for bank shareholders or depositors to monitor 
investment and lending activity.116 
These three points suggest that deposit insurance is not insurance at 
all, but, rather a framework for moral hazard and financial instability 
through an explicit “guarant[ee] against loss,”117 because insured banks 
“can borrow at or below the risk-free rate by issuing insured deposits 
and then invest[] the proceeds in risky assets with higher expected 
yields” without concern for potential loss.118  This means that the 
conclusion that “[d]eposit insurance creates moral hazard problems that 
can be mitigated only by regulations” completely misses the point:119 
deposit insurance facilitates the moral hazard that is caused by the legal 
misclassification of ordinary demand deposits, which, itself, is a form of 
regulation.  It is a strange thing to conclude that further regulation is an 
appropriate remedy to a problem that exists only because of the 
prevailing regulatory structure.  In practice, the process of “insuring” 
deposits is essential to maintain the illusion that deposits are 
simultaneously bailments and loans, and thus available for withdrawal 
by depositors and for lending or investment by banks.  Without deposit 
insurance, depositors would ensure that their deposits were legally 
classified as bailments, not loans, or else would insist upon interest 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors, supra note 94, at 218–19 
(quoting Fischel, Rosenfield, & Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding 
Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 314 (1987) (internal ellipses removed)). 
 116. See Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking 
System Stability?, supra note 114 (“[T]he adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank 
stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors, 
where the scheme is funded, and where the scheme is run by the government rather 
than by the private sector.”) (emphasis added). 
 117. MCCOY, supra note 91, at 10 (arguing that deposit insurance is not really 
insurance because it does not guard against a defined, preventable loss). 
 118. Suphap, Toward Effective Risk-Adjusted Bank Deposit Insurance, supra note 
107, at n.62 (quoting Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk & Market Power in 
Banking, 80 AMER. ECON. REV. 1183, 1183 (1990)). 
 119. V. V. Chari, Banking Without Deposit Insurance or Bank Panics:  Lessons 
from a Model of the U.S. National Banking System, 13(3) FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
MINNEAPOLIS QUARTERLY REV. 3, 17 (1989), available at 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr1331.pdf. 
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payments to compensate for the risk of loss.  Moral hazard would not 
exist in this context, and systemic financial instability would be 
somewhat less, if ordinary bank deposits were classified as bailments 
instead of loans. 
F. DILUTION OF THE VALUE OF MONEY BY DEPOSIT INSURANCE PAYOUTS 
Moral hazard is not the end of the problem, however.  As stated 
above, banks are able to distribute the risks of loss to other banks, their 
shareholders, and depositors.  But, they are able also to distribute the 
risk of loss to the monetary unit generally.  During times of severe 
economic crisis, dilution of the monetary unit serves as the primary 
means employed by the FDIC to meet its guarantee obligations.  When 
the FDIC’s reserve fund is insufficient to meet its payout obligations, 
the FDIC has few options but to require participating insured institutions 
to pre-pay certain assessments,120 or to borrow from the United States 
Treasury.121  As a practical matter, the source of the funds delivered to 
the FDIC may be the same in either case.  For example, during the 
financial crisis, the FDIC elected to require participating insured 
institutions to prepay about $46 billion in assessments, as discussed 
above.122  At the same time, the excess reserves of such participating 
institutions reached historic levels.123  Reserves, of course, are generated 
when the Federal Reserve purchases securities from insured financial 
                                                                                                                 
 120. 12 C.F.R. § 327.12 (2013). 
 121. 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a) (2012) (“The [FDIC] is authorized to borrow from the 
Treasury . . . for insurance purposes [an amount] not exceeding in the aggregate             
$100,000,000,000.”).  Tellingly, at the height of the financial crisis, Congress 
authorized the FDIC to borrow through 2010 up to $500,000,000,000 as determined to 
be necessary by the FDIC’s Board of Directors. 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a)(3)(A). 
 122. Press release, FDIC, FDIC Board Approves Final Rule on Prepaid Assessments 
(Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09203.html 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2013).  Approximately $46 billion ultimately was paid. 
Memorandum from Arthur J. Murton (Director of Division of Insurance and Research) 
to FDIC Board of Directors, 2 (June 8, 2010), available at 
www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/memo3.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
 123. Press release, Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve, Monetary Policy in the Crisis:  Past, Present, & Future (Jan. 3, 2010), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20100103a.htm. 
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institutions, giving them cash in exchange.124  In the event that such 
financial institutions decline to use such reserves to make new loans or 
purchase other investments, the reserves become “excess reserves.”  In 
December, 2009, when the FDIC required insured financial institutions 
to prepay $45 billion in assessments, these financial institutions had 
stored nearly $1.06 trillion in excess reserves—all of it created by the 
Federal Reserve.125 
Alternatively, the FDIC could have exercised its legal authority to 
borrow from the Treasury.  If the FDIC had elected to do so, the 
Treasury would have had two options to generate the funds for the 
requisite loan.  First, the Treasury could have raised tax revenues.  
Second, the Treasury could have issued new debt.  If the Treasury were 
to issue new debt, it would need willing buyers of that debt.  Today, the 
primary willing buyer is the Federal Reserve,126 which owns now a 
record $2.2 trillion in Treasury securities127—the Federal Reserve 
created $2.2 trillion dollars in order to purchase Treasury Securities on 
the secondary market, and diluted the value of all pre-existing dollars in 
the process.  If the FDIC had borrowed from the Treasury (instead of 
imposing a special assessment), the Treasury would have funded that 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See, e.g., Bob McTeer, Bank Reserves:  A Hot Potato, FORBES ONLINE (May 
22, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bobmcteer/2013/05/22/bank-reserves-
a-hot-potato/. 
 125. Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base, FED. 
RESERVE (Dec. 31, 2009, 4:30 PM), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/h3/20091231/. 
 126. Technically, the Federal Reserve Act prohibits the Federal Reserve from 
purchasing Treasury securities directly from the Treasury. 12 U.S.C. § 355(2) (2012) 
(“Every Federal reserve bank shall have power . . . to buy and sell in the open market, 
under the direction and regulations of the Federal Open Market Committee, any 
obligation which is a direct obligation of, or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest 
by, any agency of the United States.”).  Rather, the Federal Reserve must purchase such 
securities on the secondary market.  In practice, this limitation has no effect since 
primary market purchasers now purchase Treasury securities with an eye towards 
selling them immediately to the Federal Reserve. See, e.g., Karen Brettell, Treasuries – 
Despite Weak 5-Year Note Sale, Prices End Higher, REUTERS (June 26, 2013, 3:15 PM) 
(reporting that sales of Treasuries slumped drastically after the Federal Reserve 
announced plans, later retracted, to reduce its future purchases), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/26/markets-usa-bonds-
idUSL2N0F21IN20130626. 
 127. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, U.S. Treasury Securities Held by the 
Federal Reserve: All Maturities (TREAST), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TREAST?cid=32218 (last visited Nov. 11, 
2013). 
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loan by issuing debt in the form of Treasury Securities; primary market 
purchasers would have purchased those Treasury Securities aware that 
that they could quickly sell them to the Federal Reserve; and, the 
Federal Reserve, in turn, would have purchased them on the secondary 
market using newly-created money.  In either case, the FDIC would 
have funded insured deposits using money created ex nihilo. 
To summarize, deposit insurance funds exist in part to compensate 
depositors against the risk of lending and investment losses that they do 
not intend to assume.  If those losses are realized, the deposit insurance 
payments theoretically can be made in real or in nominal dollar terms. 
If this is a guarantee of a real value, the amount that can be 
guaranteed is constrained: the government must impose real taxes to 
honor a deposit guarantee.  If the deposit guarantee is nominal, the tax is 
the (inflation) tax on nominal assets caused by money creation.  Such 
taxation occurs even if no inflation results; in any case, the price level is 
higher than it would have been otherwise, so some nominally 
denominated wealth is appropriated.128 
Put differently, bank loan or investment losses that result in 
insufficient liquidity to satisfy withdrawal requests necessarily require a 
guarantee to depositors from the insuring entity that is either nominally 
or really equal to the amount of the lost deposits.  Since the modern 
fractional reserve banking system is a primary consequence of the legal 
misclassification of ordinary bank deposits as loans instead of bailments, 
and since the expansion of the money supply is a primary consequence 
of the fractional reserve banking system, there is little reason to believe 
that any deposit insurance payout will be made in real, as opposed to 
nominal, terms. 
G. DILUTION OF THE VALUE OF MONEY FROM LOANS AND INVESTMENTS 
MADE POSSIBLE BY DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
As described in Part V, deposit insurance is a critical component of 
any banking system built upon fractional reserves because it transfers 
the risk of loss from depositors individually to the economic and 
monetary systems generally, thereby creating the environment requisite 
for fractional reserve banking.  Thereafter, deposit insurance obviated 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, & 
Liquidity, 24(1) FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS QUARTERLY REV. 14, 20 (2000), 
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2412.pdf. 
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the market’s demand for 100% reserve banks by rendering their services 
superfluous.  What remains is the modern banking system, pursuant to 
which monetary deposits beget loans in the form of additional deposits 
thereby increasing the money supply.  This process—the process of 
money creation through fractional reserve banking—constitutes one of 
the three primary means by which the Federal Reserve conducts 
monetary policy; i.e., the means by which the Federal Reserve increases 
or decreases the money supply in order to accomplish its dual mandate 
of restraining inflation and reducing unemployment.129  Thus, one of the 
three primary tools used by the Federal Reserve’s to implement 
macroeconomic policy depends upon the existence of deposit insurance. 
Let the reader assume for the purposes of this subsection that the 
nature of credit expansion brought about by fractional reserve banking 
(which is the result of the legal misclassification of ordinary deposits as 
loans) is a cause of the business cycle that ultimately results in the 
liquidation of the very same investments and loans made by banks with 
such misclassified deposits.  Specifically, assume that there is something 
fundamentally different between loans or investments made with 
depositors’ explicit consent, on the one hand, and loans or investments 
made without depositors’ explicit consent.  It is not the purpose of this 
Article to convince the reader (i) that there is indeed a fundamental 
difference between voluntary lending/investment and forced 
lending/investment,130 or (ii) that artificial credit expansion brought 
about by the default classification of ordinary deposits as loans results in 
a process that ultimately forces the liquidation of banks’ investments 
and loans. 
However, these propositions, if true, have significant ramifications 
for the theoretically optimal ability of deposit insurance to perform its 
intended role.  Although a discussion of monetary economics is beyond 
the scope of this Article, the net result of banks’ speculative business 
activities described above (in particular the making of loans) is an 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See generally THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, 
supra note 59. 
 130. Voluntary lending and investment occur when depositors intend a portion of 
their deposits be used for lending and investment (and receive interest payments as 
compensation for the associated risks).  Forced lending and investment occur, for 
purposes of this article, solely as a consequence of the default legal rule that classifies 
all deposits, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, as loans to banks.  Banks 
lend or invest such amounts against the intentions of depositors who, as a consequence 
of deposit insurance, remain unaware of such use. 
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expansion of the money supply, i.e., inflation.131  This is relevant, of 
course, because inflation yields a decrease in the purchasing power of 
the monetary unit.  Thus, the legal classification of an ordinary deposit 
as a loan instead of bailment is the first step in a curious process that 
reduces the inherent value of the very funds deposited by the unwary 
depositor in the first place.  In effect, banks fulfill their contractual 
obligations to depositors by meeting withdrawal requests with money 
that is worth less than when it was deposited.  And, the decrease in value 
results from lending and investment activities that banks can undertake 
only because of the anomalous legal classification of such deposits and 
the existence of system-wide deposit insurance.  In this regard, the law 
has rendered legitimate an activity that would otherwise be classified as 
fraudulent—that is, depositors intend that their bank deposits be 
bailments that, when withdrawn, will not be devalued as a consequence 
of actions taken by the bailee. 
CONCLUSION 
The default legal classification of ordinary deposits as loans, and 
the concomitant establishment of debtor-creditor relationships between 
banks and depositors, respectively, conflicts with the ordinary 
understanding of depositors.  From the outset of the banking 
relationship, the aberrant legal classification undermines the foundations 
upon which mutual trust between banks and their depositors could 
otherwise develop.  It serves as the primary justification for the 
existence of the FDIC, which can fulfill its mandate only by making 
payments in real terms funded through taxation or in nominal terms 
funded through a devaluation of money.  In turn, deposit insurance 
coupled with the default legal classification of deposits as loans 
transform legitimate banking activity into legislatively-induced artificial 
credit creation through suboptimal investment and lending fueled by a 
nearly inexhaustible supply of demand deposits.  All of this consolidates 
in the hands of a few financial institutions the power to allocate the 
nation’s deposits between savings, on the one hand, and lending or 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Use of the term “inflation” to mean an increase in the price level as opposed to 
an increase in the money supply (which is its proper historical meaning) can be 
misleading because the former ignores the deleterious consequences of inflation 
unaccompanied by an increase in prices, such as the misallocation of capital. 
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investment, on the other.132 But, it leaves depositors, other bank 
shareholders, and taxpayers bearing the cost of such failed business 
ventures; and, on a massive, systematic scale, decreases the purchasing 
power of money deposited in the first instance.  In essence, the existing 
regulatory structure that provides for deposit insurance plus 
misclassified demand deposits equals moral hazard.  This moral hazard 
contributes to economic and financial instability, yielding the 
paradoxical public outcry for further regulation.  Lastly, this framework 
serves as a conduit through which dubious social policies may be 
implemented by politicians not eager publicly to discuss or address such 
policies, thereby undermining democratic institutions in the process. 
In other words, the legal misclassification of ordinary bank deposits 
has contributed to the modern banking system in which: (i) depositors 
intend to save a portion of their disposable income without exposure to 
the risk of loss, as would be the case if they were to invest or lend it; (ii) 
to accomplish this goal, they deposit a portion of their disposable 
income into savings or checking accounts, not realizing that by doing so 
they are lending to banks; (iii) banks use the majority of these deposits 
(i.e., the fraction not required to be maintained as reserves) to make new 
investments and loans that depositors would not make directly; (iv) 
deposit insurance renders depositors indifferent to the misclassification 
of their deposits by appearing to transfer the risk of loss to some other 
party; (v) deposit insurance renders banks indifferent to the quality of 
such loans and investments; and (vi) as a result, banks make suboptimal 
loans and investments that cause economic instability and social 
turmoil.133  Simply, banks make risky loans and investments using 
checking and savings account deposits made for the very purpose of 
avoiding risk, and this divergence in intent is a causal factor that 
contributes to bank insolvency, the devaluation of money, opaque 
governance, and unwelcome economic and social costs.  The legal 
misclassification of ordinary demand deposits is an essential component 
of the fractional reserve banking system; this is its essential merit.  
Offset against this merit, however, should be a full accounting of its 
costs. 
                                                                                                                 
 132. This power results invariably in more investment and/or lending than would 
otherwise be the case. 
 133. For an insightful analysis of the social consequences of a change in the value of 
money, see Paul A. Cantor, Hyperinflation and Hyperreality:  Thomas Mann in Light of 
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